

Policy Brief Series

United Nations Policy Brief on Peacebuilding

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**Project: “Rising Powers and Innovative Approaches to
Peacebuilding”**

www.RisingPowersandPeacebuilding.org



About the Project

The Rising Powers and Peacebuilding project seeks to address an important question that has not yet been thoroughly researched: what are the new approaches that rising powers have taken to peacebuilding, how do they differ from those of traditional powers and multilateral institutions, and what lessons can be learned from these new approaches?

The policy briefs in this series provide a baseline on the roles of rising powers and their affiliated regional organizations in peacebuilding. To this point, little research has been conducted on the substance and impact of peacebuilding activities carried out by rising powers. This project seeks to address this gap in the research by providing a structured, critical analysis of the values, content and impact of recent peacebuilding initiatives of rising powers, comparing them to one another and to approaches by Western donors and international organizations. The project also aims to offer new theoretical claims about the role of the global South in peacebuilding, rooted in insightful empirical work (on Somalia, Afghanistan and Myanmar and on specific non-Western actors), and to make key policy audiences aware of alternative approaches and their empirical records and theoretical underpinnings (which may vary among values, global/regional power aspirations, bureaucratic approaches).

The project partners will also produce case studies on the role of rising powers in peacebuilding, and include: ACCORD (an NGO based in South Africa), the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), the United Service Institution of India (USI), American University's School of International Service (SIS), CSIS-Jakarta, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American University, and NUPI.

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The United Nations has become a central actor in international efforts to resolve armed conflicts and to try to ensure that post-conflict peace is sustained. Beginning in the 1990s the UN's role in establishing and maintaining peace evolved from patrolling ceasefires to verifying complex peace agreements to administering and building states with the aim of building peace. More than any other organization or state, the UN has become deeply and increasingly involved in *post-conflict peacebuilding*. Such involvement is manifest in virtually all recent peacekeeping missions (e.g., South Sudan, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo); in special political missions like Libya, Yemen, and Somalia; and in less visible engagement in places like Guinea and Guatemala. UN agencies, funds, and programmes have increasingly undertaken peacebuilding activities in their projects. All of these have been supplemented by a modest UN peacebuilding "architecture" consisting of a Peacebuilding Commission, a dedicated Peacebuilding Fund, and a Peacebuilding Support Office in the UN Secretariat. That architecture was created in 2005 to fill a "gaping hole" in the UN System for addressing peacebuilding.

There is no single "UN approach" to peacebuilding. Nevertheless, one can discern from its practices and policies characteristics that cut across the myriad UN departments, funds, agencies, and programmes, especially in contrast to some emerging powers. Those characteristics are top-down, state-centric, security-oriented, and institution-focused, with an overwhelming focus on post-conflict countries. Member states set the agenda and constitute the diplomatic framework within which the UN operates. UN peacebuilding activities privilege security and politics over development priorities and institutions over processes. Its peace operations resist adaptations to local, cultural differentiation, and rely on doctrine and organizational templates (Autesserre 2014). One mission designer attempted to craft a context-based operation and reported that Secretariat officials in New York said, "we don't want designer missions: we do template missions," (Martin 2010, 9). Although the UN peacebuilding architecture has emphasized national ownership and demand, a multifaceted template is typical of large post-conflict operations, often crowding out national ownership. Some member states have tried to bring economic development more centrally into the peacebuilding agenda. As a whole, the UN has taken steps to better integrate gender, with mixed success. The UN further struggles with providing the long-term engagement peacebuilding requires, and despite repeated internal acknowledgements that peacebuilding must take place throughout the conflict cycle, its peacebuilding efforts remain focused on post-conflict peacebuilding.

Despite the drawbacks of the approach, the UN does things that no other actor can, with both its capacity to field peacekeepers and civilians for peace operations and in terms of normative authority. For close to 30 years, the UN Secretariat and its agencies have increased the complexity of their activities and the capacity to carry out peacebuilding mandates. In doing so, the UN has pushed forward the concept and operationalization of peacebuilding for states and international organizations.

¹ Co-authored by Charles T. Call and Katherine Collin as a part of a series of policy briefs carried out by the "New Actors and Innovative Approaches in Peacebuilding" project, with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I. UN Peacebuilding: Its Conceptual Origins and Early Manifestation

The term “peacebuilding” entered public usage through the United Nations. Drawing on work by Johan Galtung and others, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* was a response to changes in conflict, peace, and UN intervention. The UN’s activities in peacebuilding had already broadened to include civilian operations and assistance in standing up new governments in states emerging from civil and interstate wars. The operations in the early 1990s in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, modest compared to later missions, demonstrated that this expanded view of UN interventions to end conflict could be successful.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali implemented structural reforms to carry out missions of the type envisioned by the *Agenda for Peace*. In 1992, he transformed the Office of Special Political Affairs into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The two departments greatly expanded capacity for peacemaking and preventative diplomacy (DPA) and the management of more and increasingly complex peacekeeping operations (DPKO). Although DPA was designated the “focal point” in the UN system for post-conflict peacebuilding in 1997, it was denied the resources and staffing to play any meaningful role.

During the mid-1990s, the concept of peacebuilding became more expansive. The changes came amid failures of increasingly complex UN “multi-functional” peacekeeping operations including relapse in Angola after the failed 1992 elections, the 1993 withdrawal from Somalia, the shameful inaction in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the fallen safe havens in Bosnia in 1994. The *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995) elaborated on the ideas of peacebuilding, stating that “the essential goal is the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” (paragraph 49). It emphasized that the term applies not solely to post-conflict situations, but to the conflict spectrum: pre-conflict prevention, actions during warfare, and post-conflict measures. Although the term denotes efforts at building peace before, during, and after conflict, the term “peacebuilding” has been routinely used with the limiting adjective “post-conflict”.

The 2000 *Brahimi Report* described the UN approach to peacebuilding up to that point as “fundamentally deficient” in its organization, funding, and concept. Its outline of institutional reform were picked up by the 2004 by the High Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges, and Change, whose proposals led to the creation of the “UN Peacebuilding Architecture”. The HLP identified a “key institutional gap” within the UN system: an entity designed to conduct peacebuilding in fragile environments in which conflict has not broken out and in post-conflict states. The HLP recommended an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission to fill this gap.

“There is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. ... Strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority for the organization. The United Nations needs to be able to act in a coherent and effective way throughout a whole continuum that runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding. We recommend that the Security Council ... establish a Peacebuilding Commission. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing

further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary,” (High Level Panel 2004, paragraphs 261-4).

These recommendations were reiterated and refined by Secretary-General Annan’s *In Larger Freedom*, a 2005 report that also understood peacebuilding to refer to the full conflict spectrum but delimited its usage to post-conflict activities.²

The 2005 World Summit outcome document also limited “peacebuilding” to post-conflict activities. In UN practice, the term is now synonymous with post-conflict peacebuilding rather than peacebuilding throughout the conflict cycle, despite the acknowledgment within the UN system that sequencing of peace activities as envisioned by an *Agenda for Peace* is an ideal type. One reason for the restriction of “peacebuilding” to post-conflict peacebuilding was the concerns of member states that an early-warning and conflict prevention function would be overly intrusive in states’ internal affairs (Bellamy 2010). Another reason for this limitation was the DPA’s role in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy.

These more delimited notions of peacebuilding are belied by other UN organs. The President of the Security Council in 2001 issued this definition of peacebuilding following a thematic debate on the topic:

“The Security Council recognizes that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.”

This open definition undermines strategic planning, evaluations of success and failure, and allows for squabbles among stakeholders.³

By specifying “relapse” in its definition, the Peacebuilding Commission reinforces the “post-conflict” character of its approach to peacebuilding: “*Peacebuilding uses a variety of strategies, processes and activities to sustain peace over the long-term by reducing the risk of relapse into violent conflict*”.⁴ This limitation has been repeatedly questioned since 2006 by repeated internal and external reviews of the UN approach to peacebuilding.

² The 2005 World Summit was organized around the progress made toward the Millennium Development Goals. *In Larger Freedom* is structured in three parts: on development, security, and human rights. Proposals for reforms to the United Nations are then laid out. Annan drew explicit links between this “triangle of development, freedom and peace” (*In Larger Freedom* 2004, paragraph 12). In 2005, member states and UN institutions sought to bring development into the framing of peacebuilding.

³ See Call 2008, Barnett et al 2007.

⁴ PBC: <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/faq.shtml#q1>. That definition is undermined, however, by the PBC claim (adjacent in the same website) that “[T]here is considerable overlap of goals and activities along the spectrum from conflict to peace. It is useful to see peacebuilding as a broader policy framework that strengthens the synergy among the related efforts of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, recovery and development, as part of a collective and sustained effort to build lasting peace.”

Key UN Peacebuilding Documents

1992: Agenda for Peace

1995: Supplement to the Agenda for Peace

1997: Renewing the UN: A Programme for Reform

2000: UNSC Resolution 1325: Women, Peace and Security

2000: Panel on UN Peace Operations, “Brahimi Report”

2001: No Exit without Strategy

2004: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

2005: In Larger Freedom

2005: Resolutions establishing the PBA: UNGA 60/180 and UNSC 1645

2010: General Assembly/Security Council Review of the PBA

2015: PBA Review and High-Level Panel on Peace Operations Review

II. Characteristics of a “UN Approach” to Peacebuilding

It is difficult to identify a clear approach to peacebuilding within the United Nations. First, the UN’s institutions are quite disparate, as will be shown below. The Secretariat and the Security Council are entirely separate from the funds, programmes, and agencies, and are related to but separate from the Peacebuilding Commission. In addition, the UN is a compilation of member states and so reflects a constantly evolving, diplomatic agreement among its members, particularly among its most vocal members, about politically sensitive issues like peacebuilding. Therefore, its statements on peacebuilding are contradictory and have evolved over time. One example is the presidential statement to the Security Council in (2001), which lists a whole series of peacebuilding activities, including pre-conflict peacebuilding.

However, some commonalities can be identified in the United Nations’ approach to post conflict peacebuilding. First, although the UN embraces a concept of peacebuilding that is expansive, in practice UN peacebuilding activities are concentrated virtually wholly on **post-conflict** peacebuilding. Since the idea of the PBA was put forward there has been acknowledgement that peacebuilding should exist throughout the conflict cycle and that actual conflicts seldom conform to straightforward sequencing. UN documents refer to peacebuilding as it occurs before and during conflict. Nevertheless, UN member states are reluctant to allow the UN to play more than a diplomatic role in seeking to prevent conflict. Furthermore, other bureaucracies such as DPKO have seen peacebuilding as a separate phase and cluster of activities that do not come under their purview. Three reviews in 2015 – on peace operations, on peacebuilding, and the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security – all emphasize explicitly the need to devote more attention to conflict prevention, which relates to peacebuilding efforts. With these reviews, the UN is explicitly seeking to move beyond the phased approach, possibly under the rubric of “sustainable peace” put forth by the Advisory Group of Experts in its review of the peacebuilding architecture.

Second, UN peacebuilding relies heavily on **templates and institutional approaches**. This tendency reflects the fact that UN peacebuilding is heavily influenced by DPKO peacekeeping and DPA political missions. Large-scale, state-centric, security and politics-focused peace operations are the norm. This is partly because large bureaucracies require doctrine and guidance to orient ad hoc constellations of people efficiently. The tendency to template missions, which replicate the style and structure of a peace operation from mission to mission, usually pays insufficient regard to local context. UN peace operations usually operate in environments in which a government’s authority and ability to govern territory are in crisis or, at least, severely diminished. Therefore, the United Nations is accustomed to taking important decisions within its own body, after consultation with elites, on a very short-term basis. This means that processes of consultation, bottom-up approaches, approaches that emphasize local differentiation and consultation with multiple local actors, are not the exception – increasingly attempted by the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the work of some agencies and programmes – rather within the United Nations.

It also means that the United Nations’ culture, as described by Autesserre (2014), is disinclined to extensive consultation and input from local actors and in particular from the diversity of non-

state actors that exist in a war-torn society. Efforts to increase national ownership have also been limited by elaborate planning processes that are difficult for fragile or low-capacity states to navigate, and states often have limited capacity to meaningfully include other stakeholders or civil society. Broadly speaking, the UN prioritizes building up the capacities of state institutions over dialogue and negotiation among stakeholders within and outside the state. These shortcomings in specification, process, and ownership are within the power of the member states and the Secretariat to address, but require some challenging new thinking.

Third, the UN's approach tends to **focus on issues of security and political processes – i.e., military, policing, rule of law, and electoral issues – over social and economic issues.** Peacebuilding has long been secondary to and, until recently, derivative of peacekeeping within the UN system. The Security Council governs peacekeeping mandates and operations, rather than ECOSOC or the UN funds, programmes and agencies whose mandates are social and economic development. Peace operations reflect the peace and security mandate of the Security Council, and its institutional expressions reinforce the emphasis in UN peacebuilding conversations and priorities on political processes, rule of law, and justice and security institutions.

With the creation of peacebuilding institutions within the UN system since 2006, some of this emphasis on security has been moderated. By bridging the Security Council on the one hand and the General Assembly and ECOSOC on the other, the Peacebuilding Commission has brought security and development issues into dialogue within the UN system. However, that Commission has only existed since 2006, and its beginning was not very auspicious or influential in re-shaping the way the UN does business. The PBF is also relatively small at an average of around \$68 million allocated annually in its first eight years (2007-14). Consequently, the influence of social and economic development issues in UN peacebuilding and in post-war peacekeeping is only recent and continues to be under-privileged in the UN's approach to peacebuilding. Where there have been integrated missions, this balance has improved but remains below the level of emphasis demonstrated by non-governmental or rising powers' practices of peacebuilding.

Fourth, the UN's approach to peacebuilding is **state-centric**. Because the UN is an organization of member states, its focus is necessarily on states and the state authorities that represent those states. This is true even where the empirical reach of a recognized government and its legitimacy are highly questionable. The UN's inclination is to deal with those authorities first and foremost, and certainly not to privilege relations with non-state actors over the government in question. Thus the UN's typical mode of peacebuilding is state-centric in relation to non-multilateral approaches.

III. The UN's Current Institutions of Peacebuilding

Within the UN, a variety of institutions act to prevent conflict, secure peace, and embed sustained peace within the state and society. Activities range from high level diplomacy to small development projects. DPA and DPKO both manage field missions in fragile or post-conflict countries. These large missions are the quintessential template-style, top-down, institution-over-process type peace operations. Although they make a unique contribution by bringing expertise,

resources, legitimacy, and international engagement, they can also be minimally suited for their operating environments, squeeze out the voices of local stakeholders with a surfeit of opaque bureaucracy, and privilege state over non-state actors. Where peace operations are deployed, multiple UN actors, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are present simultaneously. Each has a different view of priorities, timelines, and definitions of peacebuilding. They cooperate and compete with each other for access to funds, management of projects, and influence with local leaders.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

The largest-scale peacebuilding done by the UN takes place under the umbrella of UNSC-mandated peace operations, mainly through DPKO peacekeeping missions. DPKO regards itself as one of several UN actors in peacebuilding. It considers multidimensional peacekeeping as “early peacebuilding” which “enables” the “articulation” of peacebuilding goals and carries out some peacebuilding itself (DPKO 2010). DPKO manages the missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan (Darfur and Abyei), South Sudan, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, the Central African Republic, Kosovo, and prior missions such as Sierra Leone, East Timor, Burundi, Bosnia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique.⁵ The department, an arm of the Secretariat, fields peacekeepers and international police officers, provides logistical services from flights to communications in the field, clears mines, carries out demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and security sector reform (SSR). As of August 2015, DPKO oversaw 16 peacekeeping operations with 90,889 troops, 13,550 police, 1,806 military observers, and 5,315 international civilian personnel (DPKO Peacekeeping Factsheet 31 August 2015). Ten of these current missions are multidimensional, with peacebuilding tasks included in their mandates. DPKO’s budget in 2015 is more than double the core budget of the UN Secretariat, and the two largest pools of money dedicated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding are less than three percent of the peacekeeping budget. Its operating budget for 1 July 2015 through 30 June 2016 is \$8.27 billion (DPKO Peacekeeping Factsheet 31 August 2015). Although DPKO is increasingly engaged in peacebuilding activities, the budgetary imbalance between missions that field troops and any other peacebuilding initiative indicates a similar imbalance between conflict response and peacebuilding in the UN’s approach to peacebuilding.

Critiques of peace operations that brought about the creation of the PBA also led to reforms of DPKO. The Department of Field Support (DFS), which provides administrative and logistical support to field missions, became an independent department in 2007. The DFS and the Department of Security Services (DSS) backstop DPKO missions as well as the political and integrated peacebuilding missions of the DPA. DPKO also established an office for the Rule of Law, which includes justice programs as well as police and security sector reform activities. These reforms expand DPKO’s ability to carry out mission mandates with political components and the Secretariat’s ability to field Special Political Missions (SPMs) outside of DPKO.

⁵ For a list of current DPKO peacekeeping missions, with links to troop levels, personnel numbers, and budgets, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>

The nature of DPKO missions has changed dramatically. Since the early 1990s, DPKO missions have included civilian components that address political and humanitarian aspects of conflict transitions. Peacekeepers continue to patrol ceasefires between warring parties, as in Cyprus, India and Pakistan, Lebanon, and the Middle East Truce Observation. DPKO is also responsible for missions that have significant political functions, such as the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the Mission in Liberia, or the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The hybrid mission in Darfur is a partnership with the African Union. More recently-established missions in Mali and the Central African Republic are integrated, multidimensional missions.

DPKO uses the term “integrated” to mean that multiple UN and non-UN bodies are participating in the mission and have undergone an integrated planning process through which a common strategy and priorities are set, including for peacebuilding (New Horizons 2010, 52-4). The model has come under criticism from humanitarians who believe that principles of neutrality and impartiality are compromised when placed under peacekeeping leaders whose priority is a political peace process. Further, there were criticisms that integration crowded out national ownership of the transition process (Eide et al. 2005).⁶

Integrated missions seek to overcome the divide between peacekeeping operations and the agencies. Integrated missions are essential because peace operations bring large numbers of troops and civilians, but virtually no programmatic resources, whereas UN development and humanitarian agencies offer resources unsatisfactorily aligned to the political goal of a sustained peace. The peacekeeping budget is restricted to providing personnel and equipment and getting them in the field. Programs and projects that support peace processes and carry out peacebuilding are funded through UN agencies, such as UNDP. Peacekeeping troops and civilian advisers are not given the necessary resources for priority post-war programs like urgent job creation, short-term political and security aspects of peace processes, sustained institutional development, and politically sensitive areas like policing, justice and human rights.

In turn, funding for agency programs is, in general, organized through multi-donor trust funds, in other words from member states solicited through specific fundraising following an elaborate process of goal-setting. Planning this way seeks to harmonize the goals and activities of the state, the UN agencies, the peacekeeping mission, and donor countries. This funding model requires time, coordination, and political will. Projects with long-term time commitments and transitional mission phasing, such as any type of institution building, are subject to member states’ political calendars, and projects frequently go un- or under-funded despite taking place within large, well-resourced peace operations.

A potential solution is to allow the assessed peace operation budget to be used for programs consistent with the mission’s Security Council mandate. At the same time, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) could be better-funded and more frequently used by peace operations to fill gaps in funding and bridge holes in timing. However, integrated missions still suffer from an absence of unitary command structures and inadequately harmonized activities and funding streams for medium to long-term peacebuilding.

⁶ See also *International Peacekeeping* volume 15, Issue 4, 2008, special edition on Integrated Missions.

The integrated assessment and planning process (IAP) is intended to draw together stakeholders in joint planning and prioritization in order to increase the overall impact of activities and reduce duplications (UN IAP Working Group 2013). In 2008, the Secretariat made mission integration the policy in all field missions, and the Peacebuilding Fund has been used to support mission integration activities in certain cases (Report of the Secretary General 2014). The PBC and PBSO are involved early in an IAP. As the DPKO points out, efforts to fully harmonize planning are still difficult to navigate: “Peacekeeping planners need to be aware of the other assessment and planning processes that may be going on alongside the [IAP process] and actively seek to create substantive linkages between them wherever possible. Such processes include the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal (CHAP)/Consolidated Appeal (CAP), Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Joint Assessment Missions (JAM)/Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)” (New Horizons 2010, 54).

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

DPA has undergone similar growth in the number and complexity of its activities. In 1993, it had three missions in the field, while by 2014 this number had grown to 14. The Secretary-General (SG) defines special political missions’ (SPMs’) core function as preventing or resolving conflict as well as peacebuilding. In order to carry out these functions, the SG’s 2014 report on political missions groups a variety of mandates into three clusters of generally increasing mission size and complexity: special envoys, sanctions panels and monitoring groups, and field-based missions (Report of the Secretary General 2014). DPA missions are modest in terms of budget (23.51 million USD in 2014) and field presence (3,313 persons under DPA contracts in the field currently) compared to peacekeeping missions (UN Political and Peacebuilding Missions Factsheet, 2015).

Political missions carry out peacebuilding mandates.⁷ Most SPMs currently in the field have peacebuilding mandates, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, and the regional offices in West and Central Africa.

DPA field missions are those without UN troops (Kugel 2011). In some cases, this is because SPMs are fielded alongside missions with non-UN multinational forces, such as in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, or Somalia.⁸ In others, this is because SPMs are ostensibly fielded in a post-conflict

⁷ When DPA was the focal point in the Secretariat for peacebuilding activities (1997 – 2006), it fielded peacebuilding missions in Liberia (UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia 1997 - 2003), Guinea-Bissau (UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau 1999-2010), and Tajikistan (UN Tajikistan Office for Peace-building 2000-2007).

⁸ Afghanistan was the first structurally fully-integrated UN peace operation, initially with Lakhdar Brahimi serving as the head of the mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Two deputy SRSGs were responsible for the humanitarian and political affairs. The mission was also responsible for “good offices” and facilitation of national reconciliation. The multinational force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), received a UNSC mandate but was independent of the SRSG. From 2001 through 2006, ISAF was a small force that existed alongside the more robust coalition forces, in Afghanistan to pursue the war against Al Qaeda and without UN mandate. DPA oversaw the mission 2001-3, when responsibility was transferred to DPKO, which was seen as better able to manage a large peace operation. Responsibility has been shifted back to DPA, roughly coinciding with the drawdown of international troops.

setting in which the presence of troops might be counterproductive or unnecessary. Political missions are also a tool for sequencing engagement and are organized as successors to peacekeeping missions, as in the Central African Republic, Burundi, and Guinea-Bissau. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeeping mission (1999 – 2005) was followed by a “UN integrated office” when the mission mandate was changed from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, and then to the UN integrated peacebuilding office (2008 – 2014). Following the closure of the peacebuilding mission, the UN country team in Sierra Leone is guided by the development assistance strategy. This case typifies the model of working through peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The SG called it “one of the world’s most successful cases of post-conflict recovery, peacekeeping and peacebuilding,” (5 March 2014, press conference quoted at <http://unipsil.unmissions.org/>). However, the sequencing of Sierra Leone took place alongside reversions to conflict and reintroduction of peacekeeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia.

SPMs are sometimes organized as alternatives to more robust peace operations because the mandates may be less politically charged within the Security Council and because political missions are much less expensive than peacekeeping operations. The UN Mission in Nepal, for example, was restricted in its mandate by limitations from India, which did not want UN troops in a neighboring country (Kugel 2011, Martin 2010). SPMs are funded through the regular UN budget while peacekeeping operations are funded through the assessed peacekeeping budget. The two largest political missions, in Afghanistan and Iraq, consumed over half of the budget dedicated to SPMs in 2010 (Johnson 2010). Restrictions in budgeting limit the growth of the mission and can also hamper SPMs in their responses to crises. As one former SRSB describes it, “the downward pressures on staffing and funding to be provided from the regular budget are inevitably acute. ... It makes no sense to fund such missions out of the regular budget” (Martin 2010, 12 - 13). Political missions could be viewed as the weaker cousin of peacekeeping operations, which are better funded, are therefore more robust, remain nimbler, and have also focused on increasing peacebuilding capacity. Regardless, due to sequencing, political missions often operate within frameworks established by military missions, which may not be the appropriate structures for peacebuilding.

UN Agencies and Programmes

As the emphasis on mission integration makes clear, UN peace operations are carried out with a “country team” composed of other UN actors, each with separate mandates and agendas.⁹ As peacebuilding has become a priority within the Secretariat and funding has become available through the Fund for peacebuilding activities, agencies have adopted it into their approach and are adapting their activities and structures. While peacebuilding must adopt a multidisciplinary approach to succeed, there is a struggle to prioritize and to adopt perspectives from key partners, for instance bringing in women, refugees, and other displaced persons as participants in peace

The reverse of this situation is the example of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which is deployed alongside a NATO peacekeeping force, mandated with a UNSC resolution, but is the responsibility of DPKO.

⁹ UN Country Teams are present in 136 states. The UNCT prioritizes and coordinates UN activities within each state and is brought together by a Resident Coordinator, who reports to the Secretary General through the UN Development Group.

The UN’s peacebuilding orientation toward politics and security over economic development is reflected in the change in chain of command as a UNCT becomes a peace operation and the reporting line moves from the Development Group to the Secretariat and the Security Council.

processes. Inversely, while UN agencies have adopted peacebuilding into their thinking and operated in post-conflict environments, conflict-sensitive approaches may sometimes be more a way to access funding than central to agencies' programs.

UNDP plays an active role in peace operations and peacebuilding and is the largest, most important UN agency engaged in peacebuilding. Its activities generally target civil society and state institutions with capacity building programs. Although its mission is sustainable development, the links between development and conflict are clear, and UNDP has been a partner in every integrated peacekeeping mission. In integrated peace operations, the head of the UNDP office is generally a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). In 2012, its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery was active in 97 countries and spent over 114 million USD on peacebuilding activities (BCPR annual report 2012, 76). UNDP also organized and administered the Trust Fund for Conflict Recovery and Prevention, which provided funding for peacebuilding projects. UNDP dissolved the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2014, and created a smaller Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit.¹⁰ This unit addresses both natural disasters and conflict.

Other agencies have adopted approaches to include conflict analysis and peacebuilding in their activities. UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), for example, has sought to build a peacebuilding approach into its field activities.¹¹ UNEP (UN Environmental Programme) has been providing environmental assessments to peace operations, advising the Peacebuilding Commission on environmental best practices and in 2008 established an Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding. Similarly, UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have sought with some success to insert their perspective on displacement and conflict into UN discussions of peacebuilding and frequently participate in integrated peace operations.¹²

In addition, other UN organizations assist peace operations in staffing and subject-specific policy advising in areas that are mainstreamed in each mission, such as human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) assists DPKO and DPA in recruiting staff for Human Rights Officer positions in field missions and provide policy guidance to peace operations. Gender is another area that is mainstreamed. UN WOMEN participates in peace operations, and many thematic areas have dedicated gender officers within field missions. UNIFEM, the UN Development Fund for Women, funds programs within peace operations.

Gender mainstreaming and the integration of gender into all levels of peacebuilding have been priorities and challenges for the UN. In 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which 1) reaffirmed the centrality of women in participating at all levels in peace operations and humanitarian activities, 2) urged an increase in the participation rates in all UN peace and

¹⁰ The UNDP reform generally cut headquarter level positions and devolved responsibility to the missions and geographical units.

¹¹ See

<http://www.unicef.in/emergencies.com/downloads/eresource/docs/conflictsensitivity/UNICEFTechnicalNoteonConflictSensitivityandPeacebuilding%5B1%5D.pdf>

¹² See <http://www.unhcr.org/4eb25c7f9.html>

<http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/46-47.pdf>

security activities, and 3) called for better protections against gender-based violence. The 2010 Secretary General's Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466) delineated seven areas in which the UN needs to increase women's participation, including its own staffing as well as among its partners and program beneficiaries. A 2014 independent review conducted on behalf of the PBSO stated that "there remains a distinctive gap between policy commitments and the operational reality of implementing gender-responsive peacebuilding," (O'Gorman 2014, 7). In response to the SG's 2010 report, the PBSO established the Gender Promotion Initiative, which sets out a goal of 15% of peacebuilding funds going to empower women, address women's specific needs, or advance gender equality. This target has also been adopted by the PB Fund, but that modest goal has not yet been met.

While advances in gender mainstreaming have been highlighted as successes in UN peacebuilding, the inability of the UN to appropriately address gender-based violence within peacekeeping missions has potentially overshadowed any positive steps. As the recent review of peace operations writes, "ten years after the United Nations began systematically addressing it, sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations are continuing – to the enduring shame of the Organization, its personnel and the countries which provide the peacekeepers who abuse," (High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 2015).

The UN "Peacebuilding Architecture"

The Peacebuilding Commission, Support Office, and Fund were created based on the mandates established at the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Collectively, these institutions are known as the Peacebuilding Architecture. The impetus for their creation was the broad acknowledgement of the institutional gap within the UN for peacebuilding throughout the conflict cycle. Neither the diplomatic, "good-offices" approach typical of the DPA nor the large scale peacekeeping operations of the DPKO effectively prevent fragile states from collapse or sustain long-term engagement necessary for post-conflict peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Architecture was created to maintain primacy of peacebuilding in UN approaches to fragile and conflict-affected states. "The original logic of the PBA was to build synergies and coherence of the UN's (institutional and member-state) peacebuilding efforts; it was not intended as a new operational arm or set of self-standing entities. Many argued then and now that the PBA includes not only the PBC, PBSO and PBF, but the full spectrum of UN institutions, tools and member states, to which the PBC, PBSO and PBF should bring greater coherence," (Kearn, Bujons, and Kugal 2014).

The Commission is an intergovernmental body established in 2006, with the mission to maintain an agenda of countries needing particular focus for peacebuilding and marshalling diplomatic attention and funding for strategic peacebuilding plans. There are 31 member states, with a 2 year, renewable term, and decisions are made by consensus. Members are selected from the General Assembly (7), Security Council (7, including the 5 permanent members), ECOSOC (7), 5 top troop providers for peacekeeping missions, and 5 top funders of peacekeeping missions. The PBC reports to the GA and ECOSOC as an advisory body, and to the Security Council if requested. The mission is to promote coordination among national and international stakeholders for peacebuilding, maintain political support for post-conflict countries, and raise external funds to regularize the flow of support.

Countries request to be included on the PBC agenda. Individual countries are managed through Country Specific Configurations (CSCs), which identify and prioritize programs in partnership with national governments and seek funding. In addition to the CSCs, the PBC identifies and promotes best practices through the Working Group on Lessons Learned. Periodic meetings of the member states are managed through the Organizational Committee.


In its first decade, the PBC only had six relatively small countries come on to its agenda, all in Africa. Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first countries, and work began in October 2006 to address peacebuilding in these cases. These were seen as a demonstration of the PBC’s “cautionary and limited capacities” at the outset, given that both countries had established peace agreements and were years into post-conflict peacebuilding (quoted in Bellamy 2010, 204). The agenda has grown slowly, with only the additions of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Central African Republic since that time. The Commission’s agenda has remained small and is likely to shrink as Sierra Leone will exit. The impact of the PBC has been quite limited.

The Peacebuilding Support Office is a part of the Secretariat, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General. Its role is to provide administrative support to the PBC, administer the Peacebuilding Fund, and coordinate peacebuilding policy throughout the UN system. Operationally, there are three branches: the PBC Support Branch, the Policy, Planning and Support Branch, and the Financing for Peacebuilding Branch.

The Peacebuilding Fund is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the PBSO and administered by UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office. The PBF has two facilities. The first is the Immediate Response Facility (IRF). The IRF focuses on the very early stages of peacebuilding, prior to the establishment of dedicated donor trust funds and donor conferences. The second is the Peacebuilding Recovery Facility, which has a greater breadth and funds programs in countries with longer post-conflict experience, where funding might not be available for peacebuilding priorities. Together, these facilities have extended funds to 193 projects in 22 countries, allocating a total of \$587 million between 2007 and October 2015. These funds have generally been used by UN agencies and other closely affiliated organizations; UNDP has received 52% of the PBF funding. While the PBC has worked in only six countries, the Fund has had a far broader impact, funding peacebuilding projects in 32 post-conflict states since 2007. However, as the graph below demonstrates, in the amount of funding the PBF has yet to make much impact. In 2012, UNDP spent USD 114 million on peacebuilding; the PBF distributed USD 39.35 million, and the DPA spent USD 10.3 million.

PBF Funds Disbursed by Institution: 2007-15
(data as of 27 May 2015, available at <http://www.unpbf.org>)

Organization	Net Funded Amount	% of Total PBF Funding
UNDP	250,864,340.38	52.06
UNICEF	43,861,201.66	8.81
UNOPS	39,863,817.56	7.78
IOM	25,542,089.26	5.02
UNHCR	22,362,013.65	4.36
UNFPA	20,860,097.79	4.35
UNWOMEN	19,567,417.82	3.88
OHCHR	13,204,988.44	2.92
FAO	12,279,049.52	2.4
UNDPA	9,422,802.88	1.91



IV. Debates, Critiques and Effectiveness

Several ongoing debates on peacebuilding practice have continued since the creation of the PBA. These include the timeframe of peacebuilding, or whether sequencing of peace activities is possible, whether the focus of peacebuilding activities should prioritize social and economic concerns (peacebuilding as sustainable development) or security and political concerns (peacebuilding as statebuilding), and whether national ownership grounds strategic planning.

The PBA mandate is post-conflict peacebuilding, but it is acknowledged that sequencing, as laid out in the *Agenda for Peace*, does not conform to reality. Events do not linearly follow the conflict cycle, and peacebuilding must take place as early as possible in any intervention. “Sequencing does not work... effective peacebuilding must not follow peacekeeping operations but accompany them from their inception” (GA Review of the PBA 2010, paragraph 20). Jenkins (2013) points out that the PBC’s adoption of Guinea-Bissau in 2008 could be seen as a rejection of sequencing. Despite Guinea-Bissau’s civil war in 2000, in 2008, it was more fragile than post-conflict, and “possessed the chief characteristic of the archetypal prevention case” (111).

National ownership of peacebuilding planning was a goal of the 2005 PBA mandate. Inclusion of states’ governments and stakeholders for the PBC planning, monitoring and reporting processes were established early in the operation of the Commission and have been seen as an achievement. The PBSO lobbied from early in its existence to insert itself and the PBC, with some success, in integrated mission planning processes (IMPP), a position that was welcomed by the G77 (Jenkins 2013, 100). However, the PBA, in particular the PBC, has received criticism for its processes being overly cumbersome for national governments undergoing post conflict recovery (Smith 2013).

While the UN Secretariat has tried to focus peacebuilding on prioritizing institutions that can manage societal conflicts nonviolently, many member states and UN agencies have tried to keep development central to UN peacebuilding efforts. Brazil stated in the debates establishing the

structure of the Peacebuilding Commission, that peacebuilding “is best implemented by means of a core social and economic approach, rather than one based almost exclusively on political and security considerations,” (quoted in Bellamy 2010, 201). The Commission has reflected these divisions in its work. UN development bodies have a strong voice in the PBA. The World Bank and IMF are invited to participate in PBC meetings and it is answerable to ECOSOC in addition to the GA and SC.¹³ The PBC’s mandate includes laying “the foundation for sustainable development” (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission).

Impact and Recent UN Reviews

Academic literature has found that the UN’s peacebuilding efforts have had mixed results. On the one hand, the literature on UN peacekeeping shows some impact on sustained peace (Dobbins et al. 2007, Doyle & Sambanis 2006, Fortna 2008, Howard 2008). Some literature nevertheless criticizes the long-term success of peace operations (Paris 2004, Berdal 2009). In no case have outcomes been entirely positive and without adverse consequences related to the UN peace operation. The failures of peacemaking and peacebuilding have led some to argue that multilateral intervention does more harm than good, and that the international community should “let states fail” (Herbst 2003) and then carry out “autonomous recovery” (Weinstein 2005, see also Englebert and Tull 2008).

This debate on the effectiveness and outcomes of UN peacebuilding has centered on critiques of “liberal peace,” (Chandler 2011, Lemy-Hérbert 2013) as articulated by Paris: “rapid democratization and marketization” which is destabilizing in fragile and post war environments (2004, 235). Liberal peace is the UN approach, emphasizing states and institutions, security, rule of law, and market development. Liberal peace has become closely associated with “statebuilding” as peacebuilding (Call and Wyeth 2008, Paris and Sisk 2009). Richmond, criticizing the politics and ideology of liberal peace, describes the model as a “triumph of ... ideology over substance” (2010, 1). Some critiques claim that peacebuilding is destabilizing and harmful to post war societies and describe peace operations as a form Western imperialism (see, for example, Jahn 2007, MacGinty 2008, Pugh et al. 2008). However, Paris has defended peacebuilding against these types of critiques (2011), arguing that the shortcomings of liberal peace do not eliminate the good done by peace operations, the need for peacebuilding, or the normative project to improve its practice.

More specifically, the peacebuilding architecture is considered a disappointment, despite instances of impact. Kearns, Bujons and Kugal (2014) and Smith (2013) believe that the institutional framework intended to address peacebuilding at the UN is not working; Ponzio (2012) remains hopeful for the future development of the PBA, but also acknowledges its small size and impact. All agree that the most notable success was managing to survive between 2006 and the first reviews of its performance in 2010, carving out an institutional niche.

The 2010 review of the PBA found that it was not the most active, most influential, nor the best funded UN institution engaged in peacebuilding. Ban Ki-moon wrote in the PBSO’s 2010

¹³ The United States sought to make the PBC answer to the Security Council only, which was viewed as a position that would privilege the political and security aspects of peacebuilding over the social and economic (Bellamy 2010, 201).

Peacebuilding Review, “Our challenge now is to make the impact of these instruments more tangible on the ground, at the country level. ... There is also a need for greater coherence and synergies among peacebuilding partners.” The 2010 review concluded that the PBA required a “wake up call” to further its mission. Although the architecture has survived institutionally, it has yet to make a major impact on the UN practice of peacebuilding.

In June 2015, two reviews of the UN’s approach to peacebuilding were released. The High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), appointed by the Secretary General, was chaired by Jose Ramos-Horta. The Advisory Group of Experts’ review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture reported to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the functioning of the PBA. The peacebuilding review has a series of recommendations for improving the UN’s approach to peacebuilding. It ultimately concludes that the PBA has been under-utilized and the task of integrating peacebuilding into the UN’s peace activities is more urgent now than in 2005.

The PBA has failed to increase the importance and coherence of peacebuilding within the UN, and its impact in the field has been criticized and limited. The review points out that the Security Council is the primary peacebuilding actor in the UN, mandating peace operations, but PBC advice does not frequently inform SC decision making. (Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2015, 7 – 9). Since 2006, the PBC has had only six countries on its agenda. Two have returned to conflict, Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. Burundi, which was questioned in 2006 as an overly-safe choice, remains fragile. Further, the PBA has not been significantly involved in major conflicts and transitions, such as Sudan, Myanmar, or the Middle East and North Africa (Smith 2013).

Both reviews stress that after twenty years of decreasing levels of conflict in the world, the trend is now toward more conflict in new configurations. This poses challenges to UN peace operations as well as urgency that the challenges are met. Peace operations that have treated conflict prevention with the lightest touch require re-prioritization; the post-conflict emphasis of UN peace operations is insufficient.

Resources for prevention and mediation work have been scarce and the United Nations is often too slow to engage with emerging crises. ... The prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community and yet it has not been sufficiently invested in. ... Member States have not sufficiently invested in addressing root causes of conflict nor has the United Nations been generally able to engage early enough in emerging crises. ... The Security Council, supported by the Secretariat, should seek to play an earlier role in addressing emerging conflicts and must do so with impartiality. (HIPPO report 2015, vii-ix)

The Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture also argues for a return to a view of peacebuilding throughout the conflict cycle: “Peacebuilding’ ... needs to be liberated from the strict limitation to post-conflict contexts. Many of the priorities and the tools for preventing lapse or relapse into conflict are similar and it makes little sense to divide limited energies and resources artificially.” As the chair of the peacebuilding review wrote, “tidy sequencing is wrong conceptually and in operational terms. (It) relegates peacebuilding to a relatively peripheral activity. ... What seems to be lost... is that proper peacebuilding interventions can avoid conflict in the first place,” (Rosenthal 2015).

UN structures hamper peacebuilding in a variety of ways. “Deep fragmentation of the UN System persists,” according to the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (2015, 15). The review makes the point that the silos created in the UN institutional structure based around the conflict cycle are mirrored in silos between the pillars of peace and security, human rights, and development, and that more effective peacebuilding requires better integration of these areas, echoing the points made by Kofi Annan in 2005 in *In Larger Freedom*. Insufficient integration of development priorities in peacebuilding correlates with development agencies that remain only superficially oriented to peacebuilding priorities.

Critics, including some member states, claim that jobs, education, and development are neglected in the peacebuilding approaches of the Secretariat entities (DPKO, DPA, PBC, PBSO, and PBF). The review of the peacebuilding architecture makes the point that in several cases (in particular in South Sudan and the Central African Republic), development activities that were beneficial to peacebuilding have been discontinued by peace operations, even in regions unaffected by conflict (2015, 30).

Given the limited impact of the PBA, the UN approach to peacebuilding is largely defined by its peace operations in the field. These, in turn, are typified by DPKO missions due to their size, expense, and the implicit high-level political support of a Security Council mandate. Peace operations privilege politics, stability, and security, prominently featuring programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), rule of law, and elections.

Mission design remains template-driven and New York-centered. According to the HIPPO report, “Too often, mandates and missions are produced on the basis of templates instead of tailored to support situation-specific political strategies, and technical and military approaches come at the expense of strengthened political efforts. ... Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of UN peace operations.” Despite this assertion, since the Brahimi Report, there has been an emphasis on militarization over political process, according to Jean Arnault, a former SRSG and a member of the High Panel,

In the field of peacekeeping, politics also appeared to take a backseat to military deployment. In Darfur and the DRC, the two largest-ever peacekeeping missions ended up almost entirely disconnected from any political process. The Security Council was increasingly embracing forceful “protection of civilians” as central to the mandate of peacekeeping missions. But it did so without a corresponding effort to find long-term political solutions that could make the protection of civilians effective and sustainable. ... What was intended by “politics” when UN forces deployed in situations of ongoing conflicts, namely the search for negotiated solutions. (Arnault 2015).

Peace operations fail to adequately take into account local politics and the relationship of a state to society. Peacekeeping has focused on the extension of state institutions “as a substitute for negotiations and accommodation,” (Arnault 2015). Put another way, “the UN’s approach to sustaining peace is deeply flawed, tending to focus on supporting governments to the detriment of building trust between states and societies. Too often, the UN confuses “national ownership” – which is the *sine qua non* of an enduring peacebuilding process – with supporting ownership by a narrow group of governmental elites,” (Hearn 2015). Peace operations need to re-focus on

process and negotiations that continue on following a peace agreement, throughout peacebuilding, and beyond.

Template-driven mission planning processes and the increased use of multidimensional missions has further driven the dynamic Arnault describes. While mission integration is designed to streamline and prioritize peacebuilding activities, frequently there is instead a proliferation of activities without prioritization. The HIPPO recommends “fewer tasks, fewer priorities, and better sequencing” including of mandates (HIPPO 2015, paragraph 150). These recommendations reflect an attempt to make peacekeeping more effective in laying a foundation for peacebuilding, since the increasing “peacebuilding” expectations placed on peace operations are taking place in less and less propitious circumstances (e.g., absence of peace agreements, terrorist threats and attacks on UN personnel).

The Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund have been somewhat successful in promoting a more “tailored” approach to peacebuilding, in accordance with these recommendations. The PBF seeks to create mechanisms (usually “Joint Steering Committees that include the government, donors and civil society) to vet and provide input on proposals, and its foci explicitly include promotion of peaceful coexistence and political dialogue.

Both reviews are critical of the funding mechanisms for peace operations. “Despite a decade of focus, financing for sustaining peace remains scarce, inconsistent and unpredictable. Here also, strategic partnerships and pooling funding between the UN, World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions will maximize impact and share risk,” (HIPPO 2015). The lack of programmatic funding included in budgets for DPKO missions is highlighted by the PBA review.¹⁴

Critics of the HIPPO report and the peacebuilding architecture review call these documents missed opportunities to reframe gender issues. “Neither report succeeds in overcoming the ‘add women and stir’ curse familiar to advocates of gender mainstreaming in peace and security institutions” (Goetz and Jenkins 2015). In 2015, the Security Council convened a review of the implementation of SCR 1325, on Women, Peace and Security which lays out slow progress in meeting gender mainstreaming goals and little success in changing the ways in which gender is addressed within UN peace operations.

The Global Study points out that while rhetoric on gender has increased and improved, funding for gender programming in all areas remains “abysmally low” (Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 2015, 4). Similarly, while normative legal structures have been developed on sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, actual prosecutions are few. Continued allegations of gender-based violence by peacekeepers undermine the legitimacy of peace operations in several missions. The Global Study echoes the HIPPO and PBA review in criticizing the template mission approach and points out the opportunities for peacebuilding of including women in peace processes designed to counter

¹⁴ “Even if mission budgets appear, from the outside, as considerable, a closer examination reveals that, somewhat astonishingly, they come without any of the necessary resources for programming in these core mandate areas. Instead, programme resources are dependent on the unpredictable voluntary generosity of donors” (Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2015, 30).

extremism. It also makes a similar point to the other studies in its call for better conflict prevention, contrasting prevention with a militarized conflict-response approach (Global Study 2015, 14, 104 – 108). The study further highlights the fact that 1325 is a human rights document, and that human rights must be fully integrated into peace operations. This mirrors the discussions of those seeking to better integrate social and economic development into peacebuilding. Overall, the impact of SCR 1325 has been more rhetorical than practical, and when UN personnel, negotiating partners, and beneficiaries have included women in greater numbers, their presence is still numerically small, restricted, and symbolic. The study calls for the creation of a “gender architecture” that would better implement 1325 (Global Study 2015, 6)

Conclusion

The UN’s peacebuilding activities and mandates have grown tremendously in the past twenty years, and remains the standard-bearer among multilateral and almost all bilateral actors. However, its approach has been murky and contested. In the past decade, the UN’s peacebuilding approach has gained greater institutional coherence and higher profile, despite some clear operational difficulties and visible instances of both success and failure. Its tendency to top-down, state-centric approaches that focus on security and political processes distinguish the UN’s approach from both rising powers’ approaches and from non-governmental ones. UN members will continue to grapple with the balance between security and development, both in political decisions and resource allocation. Despite lingering institutional questions, the need for greater and more strategic funding for middle- to long-range peacebuilding is perhaps the most important challenge in coming years.

Annex 1: United Nations Peacebuilding Institutions, Mission, Terms, and Activities

Institution	Mission	Terms	Activities
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)	<p>Coordination, coherence, knowle</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “bring together relevant actor marshal resources and propo: integrated strategies” - “focus attention on reconstru and institution building ... ar the foundation for sustainable development - “provide recommendations a information..., develop best practice” 	Peacebuilding	<p>High level diplomatic coordination</p> <p>Strategic planning</p> <p>Promulgate lessons learned/best practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brings together member states - Develops Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS) - Country-Specific Configurations (CSC) meet on states on the PBC agenda - Develops best practices/lessons learned
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Support the PBC 2) Administer the PBF 3) Support coordination efforts within the UN on peacebuilding 	Peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promote policy coherence within the UN - Establish partnerships - Administrative body
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)	Secretary General Fund to support activities, actions, programmes and organisations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict. (UN PBF)	Peacebuilding	<p>Raises and disburses funds for peacebuilding projects around 4 priority areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Security (SSR, DDR, RoL) 2) Good governance, national dialogue, human rights 3) Economic revitalization 4) Rebuilding infrastructure
Department of Political Affairs (DPA)	Prevent, manage, resolve conflict	<p>Peacemaking</p> <p>Preventive diplomacy</p> <p>Peace operations (political and peacebuilding missions)</p>	<p>“Good Offices” diplomacy on behalf of the SG, to make peace and keep conflicts from escalating – traveling envoys and special advisors</p> <p>Political analysis</p> <p>Electoral assistance</p> <p>Political and peacebuilding</p>

			missions
			Investigative or fact-finding missions
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)	<p>Peacekeeping</p> <p>Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations... to maintain international peace and security throughout the world. ...It relates to and differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.</p> <p>While the deployment of a multi-dimensional (UN) peacekeeping operation may help to stem violence in the short-term, it is unlikely to result in a sustainable peace unless accompanied by programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict. (<i>New Horizons</i> 2010, p 17, 25)</p>	<p>Peacekeeping operations</p> <p>Peace operations</p> <p>Multidimensional peacekeeping</p> <p>Integrated missions</p>	<p>Field an oversee peacekeeping operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military - Rule of Law (including international police) - Logistics
UN Development Program (UNDP)	Sustainable development	Peacebuilding	Capacity building, focused on state institutions and civil society:
- Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2001 – 2014)	Democratic governance and peacebuilding	Conflict prevention	Capacities for conflict prevention and management supports setting up of regulatory frameworks and institutional mechanisms ...
- Crisis Response Unit	Climate and disaster resilience	Disaster risk reduction	to pre-empt future conflict, manage ongoing tensions, and reach political agreements. Building leadership capacities that engage civil society and marginalized communities, including women, to mitigate violence.
- Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund	<p>“assist in bridging the gap between humanitarian, peacebuilding and longer-term development efforts, helping countries in peaceful settlement of disputes and progress towards democratic governance.”</p> <p>“UNDP’s work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding promotes social cohesion and empowering nations and communities to become inclusive and resilient ... by supporting and strengthening of key governance institutions. ...</p>	<p>Risk awareness and early warning;</p> <p>Risk-governance and mainstreaming;</p> <p>Resilient recovery</p>	Facilitation, dialogue and consensus building

UNDP also ... provid(es) strategic analysis, policy and programme support to the broader UN system and government partners.”

“UNDP’s crisis prevention and recovery work bridges the gap between emergency relief, peacebuilding, and long-term development, helping to build resilience in countries and communities affected by conflicts and disasters.”

support in setting up of inclusive and participatory mechanisms and structures for shared agenda setting, dialogue and consensus building, ... around key governance and peacebuilding issues.

Conflict analysis and assessment

mainstreaming of conflict prevention in development within the UN system through conflict analysis and assessments.

development of systems ... (to monitor) conflict triggers and trends to enable early appropriate response.

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